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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Case No. 20040888

BRENT POLL
Petitioner and Appellant
vs
CITY OF SOUTH WEBER
Respondent and Appellee

i
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final order of the Second District Court, Judge Kay,
concerning the propriety of a 22 January 2004 closed City Planning Commission meeting.
The Second District Court ruled that this closed meeting, and another closed City Council
meeting of 28 October 2003, were not in violation of the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act. The appropriateness of the 28 October 2003 City Council meeting is not part of this
appeal. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b) to review
for correctness the District Court's ruling regarding the 22 January 2004 closed session.
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ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(1) Whether the Second District Court erred in ruling that the sole purpose
of the 22 January 22, 2004 closed meeting of the Appellee's Planning Commission
was for a "strategy session". Appellant asserts that at least part of the meeting was for
"information obtaining" relating to a pending legislative matter before the commission.
Standard of Review: No deference is given to the District Court's decision as this Court
reviews for correctness.
Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-1 et al; Common Cause of Utah vs. Utah
Public Service Commission, 598 p,2d. 1312 (Utah 1979); Dairy Products Services vs The
City of Wellsville, 2000 Ut. 81; 13 P. 3d 581; 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah 2001).
(2) Whether the Planning Commission for the City of South Weber had
jurisdiction or advisory power over judicial or quasi-judicial matters, and if the
closed meeting of 22 January 2004 was accordingly convened properly. Appellant
contends that it did not, that the closed meeting was improperly called by those without
authority to do so.
Standard of Review: No deference is given to the District Court's decision as this Court
reviews for correctness.
Supporting Authority: Utah Code 52-4-1 et al; Title 10 Chapters 10-3-2 and 10-3-5 of
South Weber City Ordinances; Kearns-Tribune Corp. vs Salt Lake County Commission,
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2001 Ut 55; 28 P.3d 686; 424 Utah Adv. Rep 62 (Utah 2001); Andrews vs The Utah
Board of Pardons, 836 P. 2d 790; 192 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Utah 1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND ORDINANCES
Determinative State Statutes include: Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-1, 52-4-2 (1) (2) (a), 52-4-4,
52-4-5 (l)(a)(iii), 52-4-6 (2), and 52-4-10. These are shown verbatim in Addendum C.
Determinative South Weber City Ordinances include: Title 10, Chapters 10-1-6, 10-3-2,
10-3-5, and 11-1-1A 4. These are shown verbatim in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee conducted closed meetings on 28 Oct 2003 and 22 January 2004 and the
Appellant challenged the propriety of both through a 26 Jan 2004 Petition for Judicial
Review in the Second District Court. Record 1-6. A series of motions and answers
followed (record 7-60 and 65-72) from both parties. The sequence of events in the
record seems confused as some of the Appellee's submissions were first filed in Weber
County rather than Davis County. Therefore, the record shows responses being made
occasionally before a submission was on file to address. Such confiision may complicate
a review of the record, but it was unintentional and has no material bearing on the case.
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The District Court reviewed copies of the closed meetings in camera and ruled, on
17 Sep 2004, that both meetings were not in violation of the Utah Open and Public
Meeting Act. Record 61-64.
The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Second District Court on 14 Oct
2004 only in regard to the 22 Jan 2004 meeting. Record 70-71.

RELEVANT FACTS
The Appellee has tried for almost a decade to acquire the property of the
appellant's family located approximately at 1375 East and Lester Street in the City of
South Weber. Record p. 9. Efforts were initially to facilitate trades between the City and
a developer involving an adjacent property which the Mayor characterized 10 Jul 2001 as
"more than a fair exchange" in favor of the City. Record p. 10, exhibit 3 - p.22. As part
of those negotiations, the Appellee funded an appraisal which claimed access to this
adjacent property through 1375 East. Record p. 10 exhibit 4 - p.28, p. 67.
The offers from the developer, which the Mayor viewed as " more than a fair
exchange" were not without "certain contingencies" as described by the developer in
communications with the City Manager. The developer also expected, in the exchange,
the rezone of two separate properties. Record p.23-27. As marked on the documents,
the City "protected" them from public disclosure until they were ordered released to the
Appellant by the State Records Committee. Record p. 10.
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Other deals offered to the City by the developer while seeking an outlet to 1375
East, some considered but not yet accepted, promised help to build the City's new
recreation center, provide advice and its own attorneys to help condemn the Appellant's
intersection, and to provide various city infrastructures for free or at reduced costs.
Record p. 3, 8, 67 .
The developer approached the City's Planning Commission on 8 Aug 2002 and
offered two options for a vote to facilitate its proposal adjacent to 1375 East. Option one
involved Mormon Church property and land reported by the developer as a City
easement. Option two condemned the Appellant family's intersection which the
developer reported to the Commission involved disputed ownership and control. Both
options cost the citizens of South Weber either tax dollars or use of a City Park on long
term lease from the Mormon Church. This is a City that at least publicly expects all
developments to be totally self-contained and free of costs to residents. Both options as
conveyed to the Commission were soon shown through the Davis County Recorder to be
factually inaccurate. Armed with just these two misrepresentations by the developer, the
Commission told the developer either option was acceptable but it favored option two.
Record exhibit #2 p. 19, 20. The developer attended the 9 Oct 2001 City Council
Meeting where the City "never considered condemning Mr. Poll's road," and that "at no
time has the council considered condemning it" Record exhibit #2 p. 18 lines 217-232.
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The Appellee changed tactics on 30 Dec 2003 in a City Council meeting when
officials then declared that it wanted to buy the family's intersection, a 50? by 50f parcel,
for "safety reasons" at a price of $12,500 which they claimed had "no effect", "no
bearing" on the adjacent property which the developer was trying to subdivide. Record
pages 2, 3, 8, 9, exhibit 1 - p. 16, 66. The family offered to help with safety but did not
sell.
The developer, on 5 Mar 04, offered the family $40,000 for the same property.
Record exhibit 1, p. 15. The Developer was reminded that private retention of the
intersection was essential to the effective control of the approximate 150 acres the family
owns south of this location.
The above events placed the Appellant's family in a constant stressful condition
for almost a decade as rumors and genuine efforts to take their property were always
pending and so documented in the Appellee's public records. This was exacerbated
by fifteen closed meetings where the same matters were admittedly at issue. Record p.l,
66. Since the filing of the Petition for Review, the number of closed meetings of this
nature has grown to more than two dozen.
On 22 January 2004, another Closed Executive Session was called to be held
between 6:03 and 6:30 and so documented in the South Weber Planning Commission
Amended Agenda. The original agenda was identical to the amended version except for
the added reference to the Closed Executive Session. See Addendum D. A survey of
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Commissioners, including the Commission Chairperson, showed that none were aware
that a closed meeting was so called. None of them had initiated it. They had never
participated before in such a session. Only one Commissioner had a copy of any
lawsuit against the City which she had obtained on her own initiative The public record
available to the Appellant does not identify who called this closed session. Once the City
attorney was on site to participate in the announced closed session, the Commissioners
voted, while still outside its normal chamber holding a work session, to proceed with it.
Record p. 10, 68.
Training was provided to most City officials by the League of Cities and Towns
on 24 June 2004. This was recorded but not transcribed by the Appellee. The audio tape
shows the instructor being asked, "Is it okay for us to receive advice in a closed meeting
about how we should vote on a rezone or a subdivision?"
"No" was the one word answer. A discussion then followed with the instructor
emphasizing that the question wasn't whether city officials wanted a closed session, but if
the reason for having one was well warranted and lawful. The City Manager in August
2004 told the Planning Commission to disregard this instructor.
After the closed session, the City's attorney left the building and the Commission
conducted an open meeting with the Final Plat Review for the developer's proposed
subdivision as a primary item on the Agenda. The City manager and the developer
pushed hard with the claim that the subdivision was ready for final approval, but members
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of the audience interrupted with claims that a pending lawsuit, questions about easements
and rights-of-way on both 1550 and 1375 East, and an assortment of other essential
ingredients should be addressed before a vote should be taken. Record p.4, 10, 11
With a 5-0 vote, the Commission tabled the request for approval and placed a
number of requirements on the developer to satisfy before returning. Among the
requirements was for the Developer to produce documents showing easements for utilities
down 1375 East. Exhibit 5 - p. 33 lines 274-279.
The Petition for Judicial Review, to Challenge the Legality of the 22 Jan 2004
Closed Executive Session, was filed on 26 Jan 2004. Record p. 1-6, 65.
The developer came back to the Commission for another attempt to have its
subdivision approved on 22 Apr 2004 without first satisfying all the requirements placed
on it when its previous effort was tabled on 22 January 2004. Failure to obtain the
easements required by the Commission was one major deficiency. The City Manager,
who is an advisor with no voting authority, and the developer argued that City staff said
easements were not necessary. The City Manager further inferred that the Mayor's letter
to a city resident reflected the official City policy when a road was in dispute rather than
the conclusions of the Commission when requesting easements on 22 January 2004.
Record exhibit # 5 - p.33.
The City Manager and Commission Chairperson, in the 22 Apr 2004 meeting,
reminded the Commissioners of the information supplied to them by the City attorney in
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the 22 January 2004 closed session. The Commission chairperson told the other
Commissioners 'that you have to make your decision based on the information he gave
you." Record p. 31, 32 exhibit 5 p. 33 lines 267-271. The text of this exhibit shows that
the only decision then at issue was the proposal to approve the developer's subdivision.
Those outside the 22 Jan 2004 closed session do not have the information from the City's
attorney that the Commission was told it had to "make its decision based on".
The Mayor and entire City Council have gone on record claiming that "it is
expected" that the advice of the City Manager and City Attorney should be followed
"more often than not." This conclusion was reinforced by the Appellee, in the record on
page 40, within its motion. The planning Commission voted 3 to 2 on 22 Apr 2004 to
approve the developer's subdivision.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellee's Planning Commission is not a judicial or quasi-judicial
organization. Deciding or advising on strategy concerning pending or reasonably
imminent litigation is not within the scope of its mission or its powers and duties. The
calling or convening of the closed executive session at issue was a surprise to the
untrained and inexperienced (with closed sessions) Commissioners. They voted at the
last second, while outside normal chambers conducting a work session, for such a
meeting as the Appellee's attorney arrived on site to participate. This vote was without
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regard for the fact that the announced subject was a matter over which the Commission
had no jurisdiction.
The State Legislature clearly meant for the public's business to be conducted
openly. This simple truth precludes a political subdivision of the State from threatening
to acquire a citizen's property then meeting in secret for almost a decade, even after the
strategic advantages of location and price have been publicly divulged, under the
pretense that whatever it may discuss involving that citizen's property (including the
supposed safety of citizens) can be hidden from public scrutiny under the guise of a
pending-litigation umbrella. Accordingly, a City's attorney involved in condemnation or
other lawsuits may also provide input to officials about what he/she believes regarding a
pending legislative proposal, but this is "information obtaining" for the decision-makers
and must be available for the public to weigh together with the rest of the information
used in forming such decisions. This is especially the case when the advice of the City's
attorney is officially expected to be taken "more often than not."

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
THE APPELLEE'S PLANNING COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL MATTERS AND THE CLOSED
EXECUTIVE SESSION OF 22 JANUARY 2004 WAS CONVENED CONTRARY
TO STATE STATUES
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City Ordinance 10-3-2 shows a large Scope of Responsibility for the Planning
Commission of the City of South Weber, but it does not include anything of a judicial or
quasi-judicial nature.
Ordinance 10-3-5 provides details of the Powers and Duties expected of this
Commission, but those too reflect nothing of jurisdiction or authority over judicial or
quasi-judicial matters. This ordinance allows the City Council to expand the
Commission's role as needed, but there is nothing in the record to suggest an expansion
involving judicial matters was ever envisioned. No other City official or employee is
authorized, by City Ordinance and duties and powers described therein, to provide more
than advice, evaluation and encouragement to the Commission. They cannot call or
convene meetings for it. The above facts have since been reinforced 24 Jun 2004 to City
officials by an instructor from the League of Cities and Towns, but in August 2004, the
City Manager told the City's Planning Commissioners to disregard this instructor.
Addendum D shows both the original and amended agendas for the 22 Jan 2004
Planning Commission meeting. The difference between the two is that the amended
agenda stated that a Closed Executive Session would be held between 6:03 and 6:30. This
allowed three minutes for the Commissioners, who had never attended a closed executive
session or been trained at that time about how to conduct one, to make a responsible
decision. Three minutes to study, decide and vote whether they had jurisdiction over the
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"pending-litigation" issues the City Manager and City attorney implied they were there to
address; and whether they wished to participate in such a meeting at that exact moment.
Surveys noted in the record indicate none of the Commissioners were aware of the
amended agenda when it was published and only one had a copy of any litigation-related
documents involving the City.
As the City Attorney was already in attendance to participate only in the closed
session, the commission voted during its work meeting to go ahead with it.
This approval was perfunctory. The closed session was effectively called earlier
when so expressly defined on the amended agenda and actuated when the City's attorney
arrived to participate. Perhaps a commission with some experience or prior training may
have been so enabled to send the City's attorney home without hearing what he had to
offer. However, this inexperienced Commission was not then trained about closed
sessions, but they were aware that the City's policy was to follow the advice of the City
Manager and Attorney "more often than not."
Since the Commission did not generate the amended agenda which announced this
closed session or have any jurisdiction over the subject it covered, who really called this
meeting? The record shows the developer, enabled by the City Manager, provided
misinformation to the Planning Commission on 8 Aug 2002, and manipulated it to vote
on two options both of which would supply taxpayer funds/resources to further its
proposed subdivision. The record also shows this developer offering to trade land to the
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City for "more than a fair exchange," but documents (previously withheld from public
disclosure) prove the developer actually required completed rezones by the City of the
developer's proposed subdivision and another parcel as terms in this 'sweetheart'
transaction. The fact that the City tried unsuccessfully to "protect" this offer from public
disclosure indicates that City officials were at least entertaining the barter of their
legislative and administrative votes for "more than favorable" exchanges of value.
This apparent willingness, to accept value from the developer in exchange for
legislative and administrative help from the City, spawned a wave of similar offers from
the developer. Some are shown and acknowledged by the Appellant in the record.
Others are well documented in City documents and one can only worry over how many
others are still "protected" from view.
Appellant asserts that the closed meeting of 22 Jan 2004 was part of this informal
partnership. This is premised on the fact that Planning Commissioners were told 22 Apr
2004, regarding the City attorney's closed meeting advice, "that you have to make your
decision based on the information he gave you." The decision at issue regarded final
approval of the developer's subdivision. See record exhibit 5, p.33, lines 267-271.
One of the major changes seemingly induced by the substance of the close meeting
was release of the developer from Commission requirements to acquire easements for
utilities planned for 1375 East. The City Manager claimed in the open session (see
exhibit 5) that the Mayor, not the Commission, interpreted questions over what is
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construed as a public street. However, City Ordinance 10-1-6 shows than when such
questions arise, the interpretation of the Planning Commission "shall be construed as the
official interpretation thereof." This Ordinance further sets the procedure where City
officials, including the Mayor and City Manager, may disagree with the Commission's
interpretation by elevating such disagreements eventually to District Court.
Taken independently from the record, the City Manager's input during public
portions of the 22 Apr 2004 meeting, besides being contrary to City Ordinances, was
readily dismissed by a commissioner who questioned "by what authority does the Mayor
say it is not their property (Daines and Dickamore properties)." Also, if a Court order
was necessary to reverse the Commission's conclusion regarding ownership of 1375 East
as reflected by its 22 Jan 2004 decisions, then "that is what we need here before we
proceed" with the Commission's considerations of the subdivision. Exhibit 5, p.33 lines
275-279, 282-285. While two voted to retain all the Commission's 22 Jan 2004
requirements of the developer, the deciding three (without benefit of an explanation)
apparently acquiesced to whatever they were told they had to make their "decision based
on" from the closed meeting. This acquiescence violations City Ordinance 10-1-6.
Other unresolved questions including a pending lawsuit over zoning, a
controversial proposed easement through the City park and safety problems coming
through 1550 East were still at issue. City Ordinance 11-1-1 4, A states that City officials
are to avoid "premature subdivisions".
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Ignoring those unresolved problems seems inconceivable in view of the
Commission's regulatory responsibilities but stresses the weight that the Commissioners
must have placed on the information they obtained in the closed meeting.
Besides the hundreds of thousands the City stands to gain from impact fees, the
only apparent reason for the City to allow this subdivision to move forward with so many
unresolved problems would be to satisfy deal(s) with the developer such
as the one the developer earlier solicited and the City tried to keep secret involving this
same property. Record exhibit 3. p. 23-27.
It is expected that a portion of the minutes of the closed meeting will show the City
Manager and City Attorney providing instruction for the Commission to approve the
Subdivision in spite of the pending lawsuits, easement issues, etc. If further deals with
the developer are documented is doubtful as the 'sweetheart9 arrangement shown in
exhibit 3 was not widely known even among City officials and was well hidden by the
City for several years until the State Records Committee ordered its release.
The advice/instruction from the City's paid advisors which should be followed
"more often than not" (Record p. 40) must also have weighed heavily in the
Commission's switch from a 5-0 vote, to table the developer's proposal until problems
earlier identified were resolved, to a 3-2 vote for approval without full resolution.
Although the City placed an inordinate value on the input of its paid advisors, they
are still just advisors. The elected and appointed City officials are responsible, in accord
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with State laws and City ordinances, for their own actions and failures to act when action
is necessary. The Planning Commissioners violated State law by allowing some
unknown individual, without authorization to do so, to amend their agenda which
effectively convened a closed meeting to discuss or act upon a subject over which that
public body had no jurisdiction or advisory power. Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-2 (l)(2)(a).
Andrews vs Utah Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d 790; 192 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Utah
1992) stressed the plain language of the Act as above cited. Without the authority here to
convene the meeting, or the jurisdiction or advisory power over the matter for which it
was to be conducted, the plain language as described in the Act was not satisfied.
The amended agenda cited a closed session justified under Utah Code Ann. § 52-45 (1) (a) (iii), but the scope of responsibility for the City's Planning Commission as
described in City Ordinance 10-3-2 and its powers and duties as described in City
Ordinance 10-3-5 make no reference whatsoever to providing advice or "strategy" about
pending litigation.
The Commissioners should have been suspicious as they never had been in such a
meeting, and had never even been provided with copies of information or lawsuits over
which to potentially provide advice. Their paid advisors only allowed them three mimites
(from 6:00 to 6:03) as shown on the amended agenda to question the propriety of the
meeting and vote to close the open session. Minutes from the work meeting show those
three to five minutes were used to discuss other unrelated issues.
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They made the wrong

decision and were belatedly so informed by an instructor for the League of Cities and
Towns on 24 June 2004. The City Manager told the Commission, in August 2004, to
disregard this instructor's advice. Following the advice of the City Manager rather than
insisting on taking the time to study this matter independently, led to the Commission's
vote in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-5(1) (a) (iii).
In Kearns-Tribune Corp vs Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 Ut 55; 28 P.3d
686; 424 Utah Adv. Rep 62 (Utah 2001), the Court reasoned that a pivotal factor it had to
decide was whether the matter before the state political entity was, in fact, litigation.
Litigation may have been discussed in some general way in the closed 22 Jan 2004
session, but the fact that the City's Planning Commission was told to "make decisions",
legislative decisions not judicial ones, based on information the City's attorney provided
during the closed session illustrates well the "matter" really before the Commission.
The sequence of some unknown person posting a closed-meeting notice for the
Planning Commission, before anyone within that public body had any knowledge of such
a meeting, was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-4 and 52-4-6 (2). This unknown
person was likely not an appointed or elected City official, but the Commissioners were
aw^re of this infraction and did nothing to remedy it.
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THE 22 JAN 2004 CLOSED MEETING OF THE PLANNING
COMMISSION FOR THE CITY OF SOUTH WEBER INCLUDED
"INFORMATION OBTAINING" TO CONSIDER IN FORMULATING A
LEGISLATIVE DECISION
Exhibit 5 page 33 lines 267-270 of the record shows the Planning Commission
Chairperson reminding the Commission on 22 Apr 2004 that it "had to make decisions
based on the information he (the City attorney) gave to you." This information was
provided in the 22 Jan 2004 closed session which was the only "previous meeting" the
attorney attended with the Commission on the subject at issue.
The City's intent, as determined by the Appellant, as it tried to 'protect' the
information provided to the Commission in the subject closed session is detailed above,
so those same arguments are asserted here.
The plain language provided by the State Legislature showed that it intended the
actions of political subdivisions of the State to be taken openly and that their deliberations
were also to be conducted openly. Utah Code Ann.§52-4-1. Our Constitution is
predicated on the participation of an informed citizenry.
Common Cause vs Utah Public Service Commission, 598 p.2d 1312 (Utah 1979)
and Dairy Product Services vs the City of Wellsville, 2000 Ut 81; 13 P. 3d 581; 405 Utah
Adv. Rep.23 (Utah 2000) are rulings which show it was the clear intent of the Legislature
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that "any official meeting" wherein it performs the "information obtaining" phase of its
activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but should be open to the public.
Those rulings are particularly germane to this case as they preclude the possibility
of sprinkling some discussion about litigation or inclusion of a few legal terms in any
meeting as a means to camouflage "information obtaining" which a political entity may
want to "protect" from public disclosure. The appellee has a history of frequently
conducting suspiciously closed meetings. It also employed other forms of record
suppression as it tried, sometimes unsuccessfully, to "protect" proposals for the right
price, to barter its political powers and the resources of it citizens "for a more than fair"
exchange" of value from the developer. Exhibits 2 & 3 , p. 17-27 of the record.
With unclean hands as reflected above and a well-documented array of tempting
offers of 'free' goods and services from the developer, it follows that the Appellee would
violate open meeting laws, the integrity of its political processes and the best interests of
residents by pressing for approval of this developer's controversial subdivision in secret
when the same actions could not withstand public scrutiny.

CONCLUSION
In accord with Utah Code Ann.§ 52-4-10 (1)(2) and the above arguments and
evidence, the Appellant respectfully asks the Court to review the minutes of the closed
22 Jan 2004 Planning Commission meeting in camera then order their release for public
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review, and to order additional sanctions against the Appellee as the Court deems
appropriate in view of the damaged political processes and resulting injury to residents
caused by the violations at issue. Appellant further asks the Court to award him court
costs and related expenses plus any further forms of relief the Court decides are
warranted.

Brent Poll
ProSe
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Addendum A

g^jMi matter o v e t ^ p c f ^ ^ ^ p | c | ^ y ^ | m V
Miction or a d v i s o t y ^ t o j ^ ^ f c ^m the
ig of a meeting of#:|>ub^c|t^]^a, pstfon or
sons authorized to do sor for t ^ e ^ n ^ purpose of
iiscussing or acting upon a subject'%^er which that
public body has jurisdiction
Administrative Law > Agency Adjudication > Hearings
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of
Review > Abuse of Discretion
[HN3] The grant or denialvf a commutation hearing is a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the Utah
Board of Pardons, so long as that discretion is exercised
consistent with the rules of the board, the statutes of Utah
state, and the Utah and federal constitutions Utah Const
art. VII, § 12.
COUNSEL:
R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake City, for the State of
Utah.
Robert R. Wallace, Daniel S, McConkie, Salt Lake City,
for the State of Utah, Blanchard, Haun; titers, Sibbett,
Carver, and Keller* Lorenzo Miller, Salt Lake City, for
the Bd. of Pardons.
Timothy K. Ford, Seattle^ taorcloii G. Greiner, Donald A.
Degnan, Denver, Julius Chambers, Stdve Hawkins, New
York, Robert M Anderson, Salt Lake CityJVorAndrews.
JUDGES: Durham, Stewart
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM
OPINION:
[*792] PER CURIAM:

r

William Andrews ha$.filed an Application seeking a
writ of habeas cor^MSffiiS^an extraordinary writ,
contending that the Board|of Pardon$;failed to comply
with the Open and Public Meetings Acl and violated his
constitutional rights in denying his request for a
commutation hearing and in declining to hold hearings
on the matter. Andrews filed this petition with this court
on July 23, 1992. The following day was a legal holiday
in Utah. As of the time of this order, the [**2] Board of
Pardons has not responded to the petition Just as this
opinion was being finalized, an amicus brief was filed by
the State, together with a motion for leave to file. We
grant the motion and have^considered the State's brief.
We treat the petition only as a request for an
extraordinary writ. See Utah & App. P. 19. We rule as
follows:

% We begin with Andrews' argument that the Board of
Pardons foiled to comply with the Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act because it spent more than six weeks
reviewing Andrews1 petition for a commutation hearing
without ever holding an open, public hearing on its factfinding and decision-making processes. Because of this
failure, Andrews contends, this court should void the
Board's denial of a commutation hearing We agree in
part.
We agree with Andrews that [HN1] the Utah OpenN
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. § § 52-4-1 to
-9, applies to the proceedings of the Board of Pardons
because the Board is a "public body" within the meaning
of the Act^See id. § 52-4-2(2). The State argues that
the process by which the Board arrived at the decision
not to grant a commutation hearing was not a "meeting"
within the meaning of the Act [**3] and, therefore, the
Act has no application here. We reject the State's
argument. The plain language of the definitional section
of the Act provides that meetings of the sort conducted
by the Board are covered by the Act's provisions. [HN2]
Section 52-4-2 provides that a "meeting" is
the convening of a public body, with a_

"Convening" . . > lf!S8!IS!raPOTing of,a
fleeting of a public body by. a person ^r persons
-authorized to do so for the express purpose of discussing
or acting upon a subject over which that public body has
jurisdiction.
Clearly, the meetings of the Board by which it arrived at
die decision not to grant a hearing, which, in turn, is a
necessary constitutional prerequisite to the grant of
commutation, constitutes a "meeting" for the purposes of
the Act The business done there was nothing if not the
"discussion or acting upon a matter over which the
[Board] has jurisdiction.*
Having found that the Act applies, we cannot
determine from the Board's order of July 21, 1992,
whether the Board has violated die requirements of [**4]
the Act. According to that order, the Board proceedings
to date consisted not of information gathering, but of
deliberations over the petition for a new commutation
hearing, deliberations that included a review of the Ml
public commutation hearing held in 1989. If this is the
case, these proceedings would [*793] be of a judicial
nature and exempt from the provisions of the statute.
See Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv,
Comm% 598 R2d 1312,1315 (Utah 1979)
However, the Board's order is less than clear as to
the information that was considered in reaching the
decision to deny a hearing. Petitioner has filed an
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598 P.2d 1312, *; 1979 Utah LEXIS 876, **;
5 Media L. Rep. 1780
nlO U.C.A. 1953, 54-7-15.
nil U.C.A. 1953,54-7-16.
nl2 See e.g. Wycoffv. Pub. Serv. Comm., 13
Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283.
nl3 See School Dist. No. 9 v. District
Boundary Board, Wyo., 351 P.2d 106; Stillwater
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Oklahoma Savings &
Loan Bd, Okla, 534 P.2d 9; Arizona Press Club,
Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 113 Ariz. 545,
558 P.2d 697; Jordan v. Dist. of Columbia, D.C.
App.,362A.2dll4.
[**8]
[*13l5] We are appreciative of the merit of the
defendant's argument that it is highly desirable, or
perhaps even essential, that those who are required to
perform judicial duties should be permitted to do so in a
judicial manner; and we agree with the proposition that
where judicial duties and powers are conferred, there is
necessarily implied therein the prerogative of carrying
out those duties in the way the judiciary traditionally
functions.
It is quite unnatural to expect that a
commissioner will not be thinking, i.e. "deliberating,"
upon such matters in private. This may be while riding
home, or sitting in his favorite chair, or shaving, or
whatever. His mind is with him and presumably will be
mulling over such problems. But as will be seen from
what is said herein, we see no reason why that cannot be
done without any direct conflict with the "Sunshine Law"
statutes, if they are given a practical application.
Notwithstanding what has just been said about
judicial aspects of the functions of the Commission, and
the desirability of its having the prerogative of
performing those functions in the traditional judicial
manner, there are certain fundamental propositions
relating [**9] to the cited statutes to be confronted and
dealt with. The first is that the Commission itself is a
creation of legislative enactment and derives both its
authority and its duties therefrom. nl4 It would seem in
harmony therewith that it should follow the mandates of
the legislature as to the manner in which it operates; and
should therefore comply with the spirit and purpose of
the Sunshine Act, insofar as it is practicable to do so. To
that end, if the expressions of the statute appear to place
restrictions on the means essential to the carrying out of
the Commission's responsibilities, the effort should be
made to give the statute a practical application in such
manner as to avoid or reconcile any such apparent
inconsistency or conflict, so that the Commission may
function properly and effectively.

nl4 See U.C.A. 1953, 54-4-1 et seq.; Utah
Copper Co. v. Pub. Util Comm., 59 Utah 191,
203 P. 627 (1921).
In regard to the problem under consideration herein,
a distinction should be made between the Commission's
[**10] activities when it is convened as a public body
for the purpose of conducting hearings, taking evidence,
or hearing arguments, discussions or suggestions, which
we may refer to as the "information obtaining" phase of
its activities, as distinguished from its analyzing and
contemplative processes, which we refer to as the
"decision making" phase of the Commission's activities.
From a reading of the above quoted statutes (the
Sunshine Law), it is clear that the legislature intended
that any official meeting of the Commission, wherein it
performs the "information obtaining" phase of its
activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but
should be open to the public. However, once the
"information obtaining" procedure has been completed, it
is essential that during the "decision making" or judicial
phase, those charged with that duty have the opportunity
of discussing and thinking about the matter in private,
free from any clamor or pressure, so they can calmly
analyze and deliberate upon questions of fact, upon the
applicable law, and upon considerations of policy, which
bear upon the problems with which they are confronted.
It is undoubtedly in recognition of the desirability
[**11] and practicality of such procedure that the Act
includes Section 52-4-4 which provides that a closed
meeting may be held if two-thirds of the members (two
of the three commissioners) vote to do so. Whether the
"decision making" phase is accomplished in such private
meeting, or in private deliberations, it is to be observed
that that statute further provides that at such a closed
meeting, "no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation,
contract, or appointment shall be approved." In
conformity with that statute, any final and formal action
of the Commission on such matters should be announced
or issued in a meeting open to the public.
[*1316] Upon the basis of what has been said
herein, ft is our conclusion that the "Open and Public
Meetings Act" requires the Commission to conduct the
"information obtaining" phase of its activities in
proceedings open to the public. However, we cannot see
anything in a practical application of the statutes which
would prevent the commissioners from discharging the
"decision-making," and thus the judicial aspects of their
duties, in the traditional judicial manner of private
analysis, contemplation, and discussion among the
commissioners, so long [**12] as the intent and purpose
of the Act is preserved in harmony with the principles
and pattern stated in this decision. Therefore, insofar as
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D. Open Meetings
^f59 DPSI also argues that due process requires that the council deliberate in
public. "AH meetings of the governing body of each municipality shall be held in
compliance with the provisions of Title 52, Chapter 4 [Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act], relating to open and public meetings." Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3fin 1 [1 QQQ^ f^J T n e Open and Public Meetings Act (the "Act") provides that "[e]very meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant t o ^ c l i o n s 52-4-4 and 52-4-5." Id. §§ 52-4-3 (1998). Section 52-4-4 provides that a closed meeting may be held upon an
affirmative two-thirds vote of a quorum of the public body but that no closed meeting may be held "except as to matters exempted under
Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting."
Among the matters exempted under section 52-4-5 is any "strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation."
ffiI60 That being said, however, we have previously analyzed the Act as it relates to public bodies performing judicial duties and have
held:
[l]t is clear that the legislature intended that any official meeting of the [public body], wherein it performs the "information
obtaining" phase of its activities, should not be held in private or in secret, but should be open to the public. However, once
the "information obtaining" procedure has been completed, it is essential that during the "decision making" or judicial phase,
those charged with that duty have the opportunity of discussing and thinking about the matter in private, free from any clamor
or pressure, so they can calmly analyze and deliberate upon questions of fact, upon the applicable law, and upon
considerations of policy, which bear upon the problems with which they are confronted.
Common Cause of Utah v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1979); see also Andrews v. Board of Pardons, 836 P.2d
790, 792-93 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (finding judicial nature of board deliberations to be exempt from requirements of Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act). Therefore, as long as the "information obtaining" procedures are conducted in the open and any final or formal
action is announced or issued in the open, the "decision making" or deliberation of a public body during a judicial process may be held
in private and is exempt from the requirements of the Act. See Common Cause of Utah, 598 P.2d at 1315.
H1J61 Wellsville conducted the October 9,1996, meeting in public and adjourned only for deliberation. After twenty-five minutes of
deliberation, the council returned to the public forum and announced its decision and final order in public. Therefore, we hold that the
district court did not err in concluding that the Wellsville City Council did not violate DPSI's due process rights when the council
deliberated in private.

J£ch -100 Results - legislative process open "closed meeting"
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leading to, and the possible results of, Riverton City's annexation petition. Next, counsel
informed the County Commission that South Jordan City had already protested Riverton
City's petition and offered three possible courses of action for the County Commission to take
with respect to the petition: (1) send a letter to Riverton City listing technical problems with
the petition, but refrain from appearing before the Boundary Commission; (2) appear,
through counsel, before the Boundary Commission and address only technical problems with
the petition; or (3) file a formal protest opposing the annexation. Moreover, counsel also
suggested that one [ * * 6 9 1 ] option regarding the protest of technicalities not be pursued;
and at the end of the private session, the County Commission selected a course of action,
agreeing to appear before the Boundary [ * * * 1 5 ] Commission and to send a letter to
Riverton City identifying technical problems. This closed session during which the County
Commission was informed of the background of the Riverton City annexation petition, was
advised on how to respond to the petition, was given a recommended course of action, a r \ j |
decided on a course of action, constitutes a strategy session.
B. Whether Disputes Before the Boundary Commission Constitute Litigation
[ * P 1 9 ] Having concluded the closed portion of the meeting was a strategy session,(the
question becomes whether the meeting was a discussion p f litigation strategy, or whether it
was strategy with respect to a non-litigation process. Essentially, we must decide whether an
annexation matter before the Boundary Commission is litigation.
[ * P 2 0 ] The County Commission reasons that county boundary commission proceedings are
pending or reasonably imminent litigation because annexation proceedings before a boundary
commission include adverse parties, representation, notice, witnesses, evidence, exhibits,
transcripts, appeals to the district court, etc., and are therefore quasi-judicial proceedings
that qualify as litigation. Kearns-Tribune, [ * * * 1 6 ] on the other hand, argues that boundary
commission proceedings are legislative proceedings, not litigation. The amici also assert that
annexation proceedings are not litigation. They say that the plain meaning of the term
"litigation" implies court proceedings, and defining "litigation" to include agency proceedings
would result in the litigation exception swallowing the general rule of openness intended by
the Open and Public Meetings Act. Furthermore, the amici cite Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27
Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (Utah 1972) r and Child v. City of Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184
(Utah 1975), for the proposition that annexation proceedings are legislative functions and are
therefore not litigation. They argue that even though boundary commission proceedings may
be similar to litigation procedurally, the substance of boundary commission decisions is a
matter of public policy that should be debated publicly.
[ * P 2 1 ] This court has clearly indicated that the determination of municipal boundaries is a
legislative function, see Sweetwater Props, v. Town of Alta, 622 P.2d 1178, 1180 fUtah
1981); Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Utah 1979): T * * * l 7 ] Child, 538
P.2d at 186: Bradshaw, 27 Utah 2d at 137 f 493 P.2d at 645, and we do not depart from this
conclusion. More accurately, the determination of municipal boundaries is a function of the
state legislature, as opposed to a local legislative body. This is because H / v i a ? l o c a l
governmental bodies, as political subdivisions of the state, have no inherent control over
their own boundaries as they derive their powers from the State. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08, 115 L Ed. 2d 532 r 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991)
(stating that it is well settled that local governmental units are created as agencies for
exercising the State's governmental powers and that the governmental powers that may be
entrusted to local governments are granted in the absolute discretion of the State); see also
1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3.01 (2d ed. 2000). Accordingly, we maintain that
" ^ • ^ t h e determination of municipal boundaries, including land annexation, is a legislative
function within the control of the state legislature.
[ * P 2 2 ] Our legislature has delegated, to a certain extent, this authority over
annexation [ * * * 1 8 ] and has enacted a statutory system that controls the annexation
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
10-1-6: INTERPRETATION:
In interpreting and applying the interpretations of this Title, the requirements contained
herein are declared to be the minimum requirements for the purposes set forth, unless
otherwise specifically stated. If, in the course of administration hereof, a question arises
as to the meaning of any phrase, section or chapter, the interpretation thereof given by the
Planning Commission shall be construed to be the official interpretation thereof In the
event that there is a need of further interpretation by any person, firm or corporation or
official of the City, they shall submit the question to the Board of Adjustment, which is
authorized to interpret the Title as provided herein. Where the question is still unsatisfied,
the applicant may either apply for an amendment to this Title to clarify the portion thereof
which is in question or may file a petition with a court of competent jurisdiction for final
interpretation. (1989 Code § 12-1-006)

CHAPTER 3
PLANNING COMMISSION
10-3-2: SCOPE:
All matters pertaining to: a) the physical development of the City, except as concerned
with the Uniform Building Code; b) the use and zoning of land for private or public
purposes; c) the location, widening, narrowing, abandonment, extensions or relocation of
proposed or existing streets, also the acquisitions of land for new streets, or the
acceptance of private streets for public use, and the sale of or lease of City-owned streets;
d) the acquisition or acceptance of land for any public property, public way, ground, place
or structure, also the sale or lease of City-owned property, and the location of public
buildings, parks or open spaces; e) the location and extent of public or private utilities;
and f) the subdivision of land, shall be submitted to the Planning Commission for
consideration and recommendation before action is taken thereon by the City Council or
other City official. (Ord. 96-2, 10-22-1996, eff. 12-1-1996; amd. 1998 Code)

10-3-5: POWERS AND DUTIES:
A. Entrance Upon Land: The Planning Commission, its members and employees, in the
performance of its functions, may enter upon any land at reasonable times to make
examinations and surveys, and place and maintain necessary monuments and marks
thereon. In general, the Planning Commission shall have such powers as may be
necessary to enable it to perform its functions and promote Municipal planning.
B. Administrative Duties: The Planning Commission shall:
1. Prepare and recommend a General Plan and amendments to the General Plan to
the City Council as provided under State law;

2. Recommend zoning ordinances and maps, and amendments to zoning ordinances
and maps, to the City Council as provided under State law;
3. Administer provisions of this Zoning Title as specifically provided in this Zoning
Title;
4. Recommend subdivision regulations and amendments to those regulations to the
City Council as provided under State law;
5. Recommend approval or denial of subdivision applications as provided under
State law;
6. Advise the City Council on matters as directed by the City Council;
7. Hear and decide conditional use permits;
8. Exercise any other powers necessary to enable it to perform its function.
C. Public Hearings; Reports And Recommendations: The Planning Commission may
hold public hearings and shall do so as required by law. It may make reports and
recommendations relating to the plan and development of the City to public officials
and agencies, other organizations and citizens, It may recommend to the executive or
legislative officials programs for public improvements and the financing thereof.
(Ord. 96-2,10-22-19%, cff. 12-1-1996)

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
11-1-1: PURPOSE AND SCOPE:
A. Purpose And Intent: The purpose and intent of this Title is to promote the public
health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the incorporated
territory of the City in the matter of subdivisions or matters affected by subdivisions
through provisions designed to:
4. Avoid scattered and premature subdivisions which would cause insufficient public
services and facilities, or necessitate an excessive expenditure of public funds for
the supply of such services and facilities.
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52-4-1. Declaration of public policy.
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares that the state, its agencies and
political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the peopled business. It is the intent
of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted
openly.

Amended by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session

52-4-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Convening" means the calling of a meeting of a public body by a person authorized
to do so for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that
public body has jurisdiction.
(2) (a) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum present, whether
in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose of discussing or acting
upon a matter over which the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power.
(b) "Meeting" does not mean:
(i) a chance meeting; or
(ii) the convening of a public body that has both legislative and executive responsibilities
where no public funds are appropriated for expenditure during the time the public body is
convened and:
(A) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of
administrative or operational matters for which no formal action by the public body is
required; or
(B) the public body is convened solely for the discussion or implementation of
administrative or operational matters that would not come before the public body for
discussion or action.
(3) (a) "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of
the state or its political subdivisions that:
(i) consists of two or more persons;
(ii) expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue; and
(iii) is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding the public's business.
(b) "Public body" does not include any:
(i) political party, group, or caucus; nor

(ii) any conference committee, rules committee, or sifting committee of the Legislature.
(4) (a) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public body, unless
otherwise defined by applicable law.
(b) "Quorum" does not include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no
action, either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected officials
have jurisdiction.
Amended by Chapter 89, 1994 General Session

52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — Business — Reasons for
meeting recorded.
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of
the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant to Section
52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed meeting is allowed except as to matters
exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation,
contract, or appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such a
meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of the meeting.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be closed to the
public.
Enacted by Chapter 180, 1977 General Session

52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings — Chance meetings and social meetings excluded
— Disruption of meetings.
(1) (a) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the following
purposes:
(i) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or mental health of
an individual;
(ii) strategy sessions to discuss collective bargaining;
(iii) strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably imminent litigation;
(iv) strategy sessions to discuss the purchase, exchange, or lease of real property when
public discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the
property under consideration or prevent the public body from completing the transaction
on the best possible terms;
(v) strategy sessions to discuss the sale of real property when:
(A) public discussion of the transaction would disclose the appraisal or estimated value of
the property under consideration or prevent the public body from completing the
transaction on the best possible terms;
(B) the public body had previously given public notice that the property would be offered
for sale; and
(C) the terms of the sale are publicly disclosed before the public body approves the sale;
(vi) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel, devices, or systems;
(vii) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct; and
(viii) discussion by a county legislative body of commercial information as defined in
Section 59-1-404.
(b) A public body may not interview a person applying to fill an elected position in a
closed meeting.

(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to require any public body to approve the
purchase, sale, exchange, or lease of real property if that puolic body is not required to
approve the purchase, sale, exchange, or lease of real property under other laws.
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting. No chance
meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully disrupts a
meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compromised.
Amended by Chapter 294, 2004 General Session

52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in advance over the
course of a year shall give public notice at least once each vear of its annual meeting
schedule as provided in this section. The public notice shall specify the date, time, and
place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section, each public
body shall give not less than 24 hours1 public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of
each of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no such office
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation within the geographic
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media correspondent.
(4) Public bodies are encouraged to develop and use electronic means to post notice in
addition to those means listed in Subsection (3).
(5) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public body to hold an
emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent nature, the notice
requirements of Subsection (2) may be disregarded^and the best notice practicable given.
No such emergency meeting of a public body shall be held unless an attempt has been
made to notify all of its members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the
meeting.
Amended by Chapter 110,1998 General Session

52-4-10. Action challenging closed meeting.

(1) Notwithstanding the procedure established in Subsection 63-2-202(7), in any action
brought under the authority of this chapter to challenge the legality of a closed meeting
held by a public body, the court shall:
(a) review the tape recording or written minutes of the closed meeting in camera; and
(b) decide the legality of the closed meeting.
(2) (a) If the judge determines that the public body did not violate the law governing
closed meetings, the judge shall dismiss the case without disclosing or revealing any
information from the tape recording or minutes of the closed meeting.
(b) If the judge determines that the oublic body violated the law governing closed
meetings, the judge shall publicly disclose or reveal from the tape recordings or minutes
of the closed meeting all information about the portion of the meeting that was illegally
closed.

Enacted by Chapter 89,1994 General Session
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SOUTH WEBER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION AGENDA
nJBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that the Planning Commission of SOUTH WEBER CITY, Davis
County, Utah will meet in a REGULAR public meeting on JANUARY 22,2004, at the South Weber
City Council Chambers, 1600 East South Weber Drive, commencing at 6:30 p.m.
***************************************************************************************

A MEETING WILL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE REGULAR PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING
BEGINNING AT 6:00 P.M. FOR WORK/DISCUSSION PURPOSES
********************************************************

THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING IS AS FOLLOWS:

APPROVAL OF AGENDA:
APPROVAL OF MINUTES: Commissioner Graydon

DATE OF MINUTES: December 11,2003

6:33 P.M.

Change of Zoning Request. Parcels #09-005-0003, (20.6 acres), and #09-005-0028, (20 acres),
approximately 2300 East and 8300 South, South Weber,fromA (Agricultural) Denisty Zone to
the R-M (Residential-Moderate) Density Zone. Bruce L. Nilson, agent.

6:50 P.M.

Final Plat Review, Byram Park Estates, Parcel #13-029-0040, approximately 7400 South 1550
East, 68 lots. U.S. Development, agent.

7:15 P.M.

City Sign Ordinance Amendments, Barry Burton.

OTHER BUSINESS:
COMMITTEE ITEMS:
FOLLOW-UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING:
NON-SCHEDULED DELEGATION:
ADJOURNMENT TIME:
*********************************************************************************
THE UNDERSIGNED CLERK/PLANNING COMMISSION SECRETARY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOUTH WEBER CITY HEREBY
CERTIFIES THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE WAS MAILED OR POSTED TO.
RAYs VALLEY SERVICE
STANDARD-EXAMINER CITY OFFICE BUILDING
CLIPPER TODAY
TOWN OF UINTAH
RTVERDALE CITY OFFICE
LAYTON CITY OFFICE
THOSE LISTED ON THE AGENDA
TO EACH MEMBER OF THE GOVERNING BODY
SOUTH WEBER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

DATE : January 15,2004

DEBBIE W. COWDIN, G L E R K ^ ^ f f 1 _ jjpOT 0
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IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, INDIVIDUALS NEEDING SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS DURING
THIS MEETING SHOULD NOTIFY DEBBIE COWDIN, 1600 EAST SOUTH WEBER DRIVE, SOUTH WEBER, UTAH 84405 (479-3177)AT
.EAST TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING.
******************************************************************************************

*Agenda times areflexibleand may be moved in order, sequence and time to meet the needs of the Commission*

SOUTH WEBER CITY PLANNING COMMISSION
AMENDED AGENDA
PUBLIC NOTICE is hereby given that the Planning Commission of SOUTH WEBER CITY, Davis
County, Utah will meet in a REGULAR public meeting on JANUARY 22, 2004, at the South Weber
City Council Chambers, 1600 East South Weber Drive, commencing at 6:30 p.m.
***************************************************************************************

The Planning Commission will hold a public work session beginning at 6:00 p.m.
6:03 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.
Closed Executive Session in accordance to UCA 52-4-5(l)(A)(iii), for the
purpose of pending litagation.
*****************************************************************************************
THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING IS AS FOLLOWS;

APPROVAL OF AGENDA:
APPROVAL OF MINUTES: Commissioner Graydon

DATE OF MINUTES: December 11, 2003

6:33 P.M.

Change of Zoning Request. Parcels #09-005-0003, (20.6 acres), and #09-005-0028, (20 acres),
approximately 2300 East and 8300 South, South Weber,fromA (Agricultural) Denisty Zone to
the R-M (Residential-Moderate) Density Zone. Bruce L. Nilson, agent.

6:50 P.M.

Final Plat Review, Byram Park Estates, Parcel #13-029-0040, approximately 7400 South 1550
East, 68 lots. U.S. Development, agent.

7:15 P.M.

City Sign Ordinance Amendments, Barry Burton.

OTHER BUSINESS:
COMMITTEE ITEMS:
FOLLOW-UP ITEMS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING:
NON-SCHEDULED DELEGATION:
ADJOURNMENT TIME:
******************************************************************************************
THE UNDERSIGNED CLERK/PLANNING COMMISSION SECRETARY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF SOUTH WEBER CITY HEREBY
CERTIFIES THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING NOTICE WAS MAILED OR POSTED TO:

RAY's VALLEY SERVICE
CLIPPER TODAY

DATE : January 20, 2004

STANDARD-EXAMINER
CITY OFFICE BUILDING
SOUTH WEBER ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

>CLE^^iMio UJ ( crurA*

DEBBIE W. COWDIN

IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, INDIVIDUALS NEEDING SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS DURING
THIS MEETING SHOULD NOTIFY DEBBIE COWDIN, 1600 EAST SOUTH WEBER DRIVE, SOUTH WEBER, UTAH 84405 (479-3177) AT
^AST TWO DAYS PRIOR TO THE MEETING.
********************************************

*Agenda times areflexibleand may be moved in order, sequence and time to meet the needs of the Commission*

